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RX FOR COPYRIGHT DEATH
FRANCIS M. NEVINS, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Copyright Revision Act of 1976,1 the statutory protection
accorded authors of creative works was divided into an initial and
renewal term, each of twenty-eight years duration.2 For most purposes
these terms were regarded as separate legal entities.3 Consequently, an
author who conveyed the first term rights to his work retained the
opportunity to profit from it again during the second term. Traditionally
the proceeds received from publication of the original creation con-
stituted the author's profits. The development of media communications,
however, has greatly expanded the commercial marketability of creative
works. 4 Today the value of motion picture rights in a novel or play often
exceeds the publication value of the original work. It is not surprising,
therefore, that authors frequently license the right to adapt their creation
into other media while reserving their "copyright" in the underlying
work. In such situations, the extent to which the legal status of the
derivative work' is dependent on changes in the copyright status of the
underlying work presents a number of intriguing issues.
This article examines the effect of the copyright law on three situa-
tions. In the first, the author of an underlying work licenses the creation
of a derivative work for a fixed period. In the second, the contract
between author and licensee is silent on whether it continues through the
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Louis University. B.A., 1964, St. Peter's College;
J.D., 1967, New York University.
1. 17 U.S.C.A. § 304 (West Supp. 1977 app.) (effective January 1, 1978).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). See 2 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 113 (1963). Although the
two-term system was abolished by the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 and replaced by a
single-term system, all works copyrighted prior to January 1, 1978, the effective date of
the new act, must be renewed in the twenty-eighth year of their existence or fall into the
public domain. 17 U.S.C.A. § 304 (West Supp. 1977 app.). Thus, we will continue, at least
in part, to live under a two-term system until midnight of December 31, 2005.
3. See notes 18-21 infra and accompanying text.
4. According to Nimmer, "'copyright' is now a label for a collection of diverse
property rights, each of which is separately marketable." 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, §
119.1.
5. A derivative work is created by substantially copying not only ideas but also their
expression from a prior work, to an extent that would render the later work an infringe-
ment if the prior work were not in the public domain or its author did not consent to the
derivative work. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 39.
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underlying work's renewal period. And in the third situation, although
the contract continues through the renewal period, the author of the
underlying work dies before the renewal term begins. In all three cases,
the principle of discontinuity between the initial and renewal terms of
copyright protection mandates the same result: the derivative work be-
comes unavailable to the public, suffering what is here termed copyright
death.
A typical case of copyright death involved a powerful and doomhaunt-
ed writer named Cornell Woolrich.6 In 1942, Woolrich published a story
about a man confined to a wheelchair who survived long, lonely nights
by looking into the windows and lives of his apartment-house neighbors.7
Twelve years later, Alfred Hitchcock adapted this story into one of his
most famous films, Rear Window. Woolrich died in 1968, two years
before the story's initial copyright term ended. A literary speculator
subsequently purchased the rights to the story from the Woolrich estate.
In 1971, Rear Window was broadcast on network television without the
speculator's permission. This prompted him to bring a copyright infring-
ement action against Hitchcock, the producing corporation, the television
network, the sponsors, and the film's star, James Stewart.' Since that
time, Hitchcock's movie has been legally unavailable for public exhibi-
tion, a victim of copyright death.9
Countless films have suffered a fate similar to Rear Window and many
others escape copyright death only because of the inattention of potential
litigants.10 Yet to permit the denial of a creative work's legal existence is
6. For a sampling of Woolrich's fiction, an introductory essay, and a comprehensive
checklist of his writings, see C. WOOLRICH, NIGHTWEBS (F. Nevins ed. 1971).
7. The story first appeared in the February 1942 issue of the pulp magazine Dime
Detective, under the title It Had To Be Murder. In 1944, with the new title Rear Window,
it was included in After-Dinner Story, a collection of Woolrich's short fiction, published
under his pseudonym William Irish.
8. See note 41 infra for a discussion of multiple liability in copyright infringement
actions.
9. Abend v. American Broadcasting Co., Civ. No. 74-2336 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 30,
1974). Under the settlement agreement in this case, Rear Window is permanently unavail-
able for viewing. According to Professor Donald Spoto, who has written the most
comprehensive and insightful critical study of Hitchcock's work, Rear Window is one of
five recent Hitchcock films "that cannot, as of this writing, be seen in the United States."
D. SPOTO, THE ART OF ALFRED HITCHCOCK 237 (1976).
10. The works of Cornell Woolrich, whose novels and stories were adapted into many
Hollywood films in the 1940s, provide a host of fascinating examples. E.g., The Black
Angel (Universal 1946), based on Woolrich's 1943 novel; Deadline at Dawn (RKO 1946),
based on Woolrich's 1944 novel; The Chase (United Artists 1946), based on Woolrich's
1944 novel; Night Has a Thousand Eyes (Paramount 1948), based on Woolrich's 1945
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contrary to public policy, especially a work in a medium such as film,
whose proprietors have long discouraged sales to consumers.11 It is
argued here that the same public policies that demand the preservation of
the physical environment should apply to aesthetic entities like films.
Therefore, the general rule of discontinuity between a grant of rights for
the initial term of an underlying work and its renewal should not be
enforced when it would result in the copyright death of a derivative work
to which the author had previously voluntarily consented.
H. THE RENEWAL TERM
The Statute of 8 Anne12 introduced the bifurcated system of copyright
protection. It protected the author and assignees for an initial period of
fourteen years after the work's publication and for a renewal term of the
same length provided the author survived the first term. Although the
English Parliament introduced a single term of copyright protection in
1814,13 the bifurcation principle had gained acceptance in America by
the end of the eighteenth century.14
Prior to the Constitutional Convention of 1789, seven of the original
thirteen states had enacted legislation that provided for consecutive term
copyright protection. 5 The first Federal Copyright Act 16 contained simi-
novel; The Window (RKO 1949), based on Woolrich's 1947 short story; No Man Of Her
Own (Paramount 1950), based on Woolrich's 1948 novel. Woolrich's untimely death in
1968 has resulted in the copyright death of all six films. Had he lived until 1977, all of
them, including Rear Window, would be available today. The rights to at least three of the
six Woolrich works on which the above six films were based have been purchased from
the Woolrich estate by the same literary speculator who bought the rights to Rear
Window.
11. See Nevins, Copyright, Property and the Film Collector, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 2
(1975).
I2. c. 19 (1709)
13. Statute of 54 Geo. 3, c. 156 (1814). The Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46
(1911), increased the term of protection to fifty years after the author's death. Effective
January 1, 1978, this is also the term of copyright in the United States.
14. For an historical summary of the bifurcation principle in copyright protection, see
Justice Frankfurter's classic opinion in Fred Fisher Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S.
643, 647-56 (1943).
15. The seven states were Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia, New
York, Maryland, and South Carolina. Of the remaining six states, five-Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Virginia, and North Carolina-had statutes providing
single-term copyright protection for periods ranging from 14 to 21 years. Only Delaware
had no copyright statute at all. Fred Fisher Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643,649
(1943).
16. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810
(West Supp. 1977 app.)).
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lar provisions. In 1831, Congress enacted the second Copyright Act, 17
which increased the initial term from fourteen to twenty-eight years and
provided that if an author did not survive the end of the initial term, the
renewal rights passed to his widow and children.
Early in the twentieth century, Congress considered replacing the two-
term system with a single term of protection extending fifty years beyond
the author's life. Although it ultimately retained the bifurcated system,
Congress increased the renewal term to twenty-eight years.18 The com-
mittee that revised the copyright law explained its decision:
Your committee, after full consideration, decided that it was dis-
tinctly to the advantage of the author to preserve the renewal
period. It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copy-
right outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum. If the
work proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of
twenty-eight years, your committee felt that it should be the exclu-
sive right of the author to take the renewal term, and the law should
be framed as is the existing law, so that he could not be deprived of
that right. 19
Although that statement has been subjected to conflicting interpreta-
tions by courts and commentators,2' the committee clearly believed that
under a single-term system an author who conveyed "his copyright"
deprived himself and his successors of a second chance to profit from the
work if it became a success. The 1909 Act contained a two-term system
which gave the author that second chance.
Cognizant of this second-chance policy, courts have generally held
that the initial and renewal copyright terms are totally separate entities. 21
17. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (current version at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810
(West Supp. 1977 app.)).
18. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C.A. §§
101-810 (West Supp. 1977 app.)).
19. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1909).
20. See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943); 2 M.
NIMMER, supra note 2, § 113.
21. For a detective story based on this principle of law, see Nevins, The Kumquats
Affair, 66 ELLERY QUEEN'S MYSTERY MAGAZINE 52 (Oct. 1975). See, e.g., Edward B.
Marks Music Corp. v. Charles K. Harris Music Publishing Co., 255 F.2d 518,521 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 831 (1958); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d
469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951); Rossiter v. Vogel, 134 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.
1943); White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247 (1st Cir. 1911). In construing
the renewal provision of the 1909 Act, the court in Harris v. Coca-Cola Co., 73 F.2d 370,
371 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 709 (1934), stated:
The second period is intended, not as an incident of the first for the benefit of the
then owner of the expiring copyright, but as a second recognition extended by the
[Vol. 1977:601
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Judicial deference to this principle has extended to contract law; whenev-
er an assignment does not explicitly include the renewal term, courts
have construed a grant of rights by an author as extending for the initial
term only. Under such a construction, the grantee seeking to retain rights
to the work during its renewal period must negotiate a new agreement
with the author or his successors at the beginning of the second term.22
Although the 1909 Act was clearly designed to give the author a
second chance, neither the Act nor the committee report considers
whether the author possesses the power during term one to convey his
contingent interest in term two. Courts interpreting the earlier copyright
acts in England and the United States had assumed the author retained
this power. Thus, in Carnan v. Bowles23 the court held that an assign-
ment of "all of my interest," without mention of the renewal term,
conveyed the author's first term rights and contingent interest in the
renewal term. In Rundell v. Murray,24 Lord Chancellor Eldon said in
dictum: "I conceive that an author will not be taken to have assigned his
contingent right in case of his surviving the fourteen years, unless the
assignment is so expressed as to purport to pass it .... ",25 This
decision, like its predecessors, recognizes the power of an author to
execute an assignment of contingent rights, despite the court's differing
view as to when that power should be deemed to have been exercised. 6
The same power was acknowledged in the copyright statutes of five
out of the seven original states with a two-term scheme of protection. 27
All of these pre-1789 statutes conferred the renewal right on the author
and "his heirs and assigns." Similarly, the Federal Copyright Act of
law to the author of work that has proven permanently meritorious by giving to
him . . . a supplementary copyright upon the terms stated in the statute.
See generally 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 113.
22. See notes 52-78 infra and accompanying text. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 117.
Cf. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 647-52 (1943) (when
explicit, assignment during initial term may validly assign renewal term rights if they
subsequently vest).
23. 29 Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch. 1786).
24. 37 Eng. Rep. 868 (Ch. 1821).
25. Id. at 870.
26. More recent American cases have held that whether a document of assignment
will be construed as a valid assignment of the renewal term is a matter of intention. See
Venus Music Corp. v. Mills Music Inc., 261 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1958); Edward B. Marks
Music Corp. v. Charles K. Harris Music Publishing Co., 255 F.2d 518 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 831 (1958); Rossiter v. Vogel, 134 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1943). See generally 2
M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 117.1.
27. The five states were Connecticut, Georgia, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsyl-
vania. See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 649 (1943).
Number 41
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179028 conferred the right of renewal upon the author or his "executors,
administrators or assigns." These state and federal Copyright Acts argu-
ably provided only that an author who survived into the renewal term
could then convey his rights by will or inter vivos agreement. Courts,
however, reasoned that because legislatures did not explicitly reject the
English precedent, the copyright acts permitted assignment of the contin-
gent renewal right during the initial term. 29
The second Federal Copyright Act 30 failed to provide that an author's
"assigns" could renew a copyright. In subsequent cases, courts assumed
that authors could still assign their renewal interest during the initial
term. The policy of favoring authors of copyrighted works, however, led
most courts to hold that absent express language granting rights in the
renewal term the author did not intend by an assignment of copyright to
convey his contingent right in the second term. 31 Nevertheless, these
courts acknowledged the author's power to make a valid conveyance if
he so intended.32
The power thus recognized by both English and American courts prior
to the 1909 Copyright Act did not unequivocally benefit authors and their
families. An author with little bargaining power could be pressured to
sign an inter vivos agreement conveying all renewal term rights in his
work. If the author died during the initial term, this agreement cut off the
statutory renewal right of the surviving spouse and children.3 3 Because
the legislative history of the 1909 Act demonstrates a concern for author
protection, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to prohibit
authors from conveying contingent interests. The Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit so held in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. V. Goff.34
In White-Smith, a songwriter assigned his copyright in his songs to a
music publisher during the initial term and the publisher renewed the
copyright during the renewal period. Subsequently, the publisher brought
suit against an alleged infringer. The court held that under the 1909 Act
28. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810
(West Supp. 1977 app.)).
29. See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 650 (1943).
30. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (current version at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810
(West Supp. 1977 app.)).
31. See, e.g., Pierpont v. Fowle, 19 F. Cas. 652 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 11,152).
32. See, e.g., Paige v. Banks, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 608 (1871) (contract conveying all of
author's rights in his work construed to include rights during renewal period).
33. Succession to the renewal interest under the 1909 Act is governed by 17 U.S.C. §
24 (1970).
34. 187 F. 247 (1st Cir. 1911).
[Vol. 1977:601
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an assignee had no power to renew a copyright under a first-term
assignment and dismissed the suit.35
In 1943, however, the Supreme Court held in the landmark case of
Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons36 that an author had the
power during the first term to sign away his contingent rights in the
renewal term. The Fisher decision remains the law and even Professor
Nimmer, who disagrees with much of the reasoning in Justice Frankfur-
ter's opinion, concedes that Fisher "is undoubtedly viable law with no
reasonable expectation of its modification short of the enactment of a
new law." 37
The Supreme Court did not, however, resolve the copyright death
conundrum. Fisher established that if an author clearly conveys the
movie rights in his novel for both the initial and renewal terms and
survives the first term, the movie can be exhibited during the renewal
term by the assignee.38 It did not consider situations in which either the
contract failed to mention renewal term or the novelist died during the
first term. Until recently, courts have applied the general rule that the
initial and renewal terms are separate entities. 39 Consequently, the film-
maker may not exhibit the film in the renewal term until he has
negotiated a new agreement with the author or his successors. If the
assignee exhibits the film during the second term because he is unaware
of the novelist's untimely death or he fails to negotiate a new agreement,
all parties to the exhibition, including the sponsors, are liable for
infringement.' Moreover, if a literary speculator, knowledgeable in
35. Id. at 249.
36. 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
37. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 117.21. The new Copyright Act abolishes the
renewal term and uses the device of an inalienable "right of termination" to give the
author a second chance to profit from the work. By providing in 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a)(5)
(West Supp. 1977 app.) that termination may be effected "notwithstanding any agreement
to the contrary," Congress has restored the author to his status under the Goff case. See
notes 34-35 supra.
38. 318 U.S. at 656, 657.
39. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
40. If by operation of the succession provisions to the Copyright Act of 1909, devise,
or intestate succession laws, the renewal interest is fragmented among several parties, the
filmmaker may be unable to locate or obtain the unanimous agreement of all interest
holders. In such a situation the film will suffer copyright death.
41. The leading cases on sponsors' liability for an infringing telecast are: Rohauer v.
Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d
484 (2d Cir. 1977); Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 601
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y.
Number 4]
Washington University Open Scholarship
608 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
copyright law, purchases the successors' renewal interests in the work,
he can hold the work for ransom. If the filmmaker or publisher does not
comply with the speculator's terms, the work will suffer copyright death.
III. THE DUBIOUS ROOTS OF THE NEW PROPERTY RIGHT THEORY
The judicial debate over the meaning of the renewal provisions of the
1909 Act reflects a basic policy disagreement. The protective policy
gives the author and his successors a second chance to profit from his
creativity. The laissez-faire policy, on the other hand, permits an author
to convey his contingent interest in the renewal term as if it were an
interest in real or personal property. Unfortunately, this judicial debate
has failed to consider the policy favoring the continued existence of a
creative work, and its derivative works, once that work exists. One
interpretation of the copyright law supports this third policy con-
sideration, but its analytical and historical roots are weak. Professor
Nimmer describes this "new property right" theory:
It has been suggested that once a derivative work is created
pursuant to a valid license to use the underlying material, a new
property right springs into existence with respect to the entire de-
rivative work, so that even if the license is thereafter terminated the
proprietor of the derivative work may nevertheless continue to use
the material from the underlying work as contained in the derivative
work.42
The origin of this theory may be found in Edmonds v. Stern43 and
Sunset Securities Co. v. Coward McCann, Inc. 44 Edmonds involves a
dispute between a songwriter and a music company. Edmonds composed
the words and music to a song which he subsequently sold to Stern.
Stem, with Edmonds' knowledge and consent, used the song as part of
an operetta and obtained a copyright on both the song and orchestral
arrangement. After some litigation, Stem transferred the copyright in the
song to Edmonds, but continued to sell copies of the orchestral arrange-
ment to the operetta, which incorporated only the music of Edmonds'
song. Edmonds brought a copyright infringement action against Stern,
and the district court ruled in his favor. On appeal, the Second Circuit
reversed, holding (1) that the resolution of the first action did not reduce
Stem's rights in the orchestral arrangement, and (2) that
1965). The test of liability is the sponsor's power to supervise and control program
content.
42. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 45.1.
43. 248 F. 897 (2d Cir. 1918).
44. 297 P.2d 137 (1956), rev'd, 47 Cal. 2d 907, 306 P.2d 777 (1957).
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as matter of law the mere transfer of copyright in the song had no
effect whatever on the copyright of the operatic score theretofore
taken out. The two things were legally separate, and independent of
each other; it makes no difference that such separate and indepen-
dent existence might to a certain extent have grown out of plaintiff's
consent to the incorporation of his melody in the orchestration.
When that consent was given, a right of property sprang into exist-
ence, not at all affected by the conveyance of any other right. 45
The court's second reason is dependent on the peculiar facts of the case
and does not endorse the general principle that once a derivative work is
lawfully created it is treated for all purposes as a new and independent
work. It suggests, however, the position urged here: a recognition that
for one particular purpose the legal status of a derivative work should not
remain tied to that of the underlying work.
Sunset Securities Co. v. Coward McCann, Inc. arose under California
contract law. In 1944 Dayton Stoddart, an obscure author, conveyed all
rights in his novel Prelude to Night to his publishing firm, Coward
McCann. Coward copyrighted the novel the following year and in 1946
signed a contract that gave a small, independent motion picture company
the right to make, copyright, sell, and exhibit a movie based on the
novel. The agreement, however, provided that at the end of ten years
"all of the rights in and to the Property herein granted" to the studio
would revert to Coward unless the studio exercised an option to buy these
rights for an additional $25,000. The film, Ruthless, was made and
copyrighted in 1948. Although today it enjoys an underground reputation
due to the critical fame of its director, the cineaste maudit Edgar G.
Ulmer,' the movie was a box office flop. The bank that financed the film
foreclosed its mortgage, purchased the property at the foreclosure sale,
and conveyed its rights to Sunset Securities. Sunset subsequently brought
suit to quiet title to Ruthless, 7 without paying the additional $25,000 to
Coward at the end of the ten-year period. In its counterclaim, Coward
sought to quiet title to the motion picture rights in the novel Prelude to
Night. The trial court granted Coward a summary judgment. On appeal,
Coward asserted for the first time that under its contract with the produc-
ing company it owned all rights in Ruthless in addition to the right to sell
45. 248 F. at 898.
46. For discussions of Ulmer, see A. SARRIs, THE AMERICAN CINEMA 142-43 (1968);
Meisel, Edgar G. Ulmer: The Primacy of the Visual, in KINGs OF THE Bs 147-52 (T.
McCarthy & C. Flynn eds. 1975).
47. 297 P.2d at 138-39.
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movie rights in the novel to another studio. The California Court of
Appeals reversed and awarded judgment to Sunset, "quieting its title to
the film Ruthless, to the copyright of Ruthless, and to all rights of
exploitation of Ruthless."48 In interpreting the contract, the appellate
court noted that under the Copyright Act49 a derivative work is an entity
separate from its source and independently copyrightable. This is the
only recognition by the court of a new property right theory. The
California Supreme Court subsequently vacated the appellate court's
decision, reinstated the ruling of the trial court, and held that "the
Property" which would revert to Coward absent the $25,000 additional
payment included the film Ruthless as well as the film rights to Stod-
dart's novel.5" The California Supreme Court's judgment rested entirely
on contract interpretation and mentioned neither Edmonds v. Stern nor
the new property right theory. 51
IV. COMPULSORY RENEGOTIATION OR COPYRIGHT DEATH:
THE LEADING CASES
The two most significant copyright death cases concern the extent to
which a derivative work is treated as a new entity, free from copyright
ties to the underlying work from which it sprang. G. Ricordi & Co. v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc. 52 dealt with John Luther Long, a forgotten
author, who in 1897 published the novel Madame Butterfly. In 1900 the
theatrical impresario David Belasco wrote a stage play based on the novel
with Long's oral consent. The following year, Belasco and Long entered
into a contract with G. Ricordi, the famous music publishing company,
in which the authors conveyed to Ricordi "the exclusive right for all
countries of the world in all languages to make a Libretto for an opera"
based on the Belasco play which was based on Long's novel; "the said
Libretto and all rights therein dramatic or otherwise" would be the
exclusive property of Ricordi.
As a result, Puccini wrote his classic opera, Madame Butterfly, which
Ricordi copyrighted in the United States in 1904. In 1917 David Belasco
48. Id. at 141.
49. 17 U.S.C. §§ 5(1), 27 (1970).
50. 47 Cal. 2d at 911-12, 306 P.2d at 779-80.
51. Inquiry at the offices of Coward-McCann has proved fruitless in determining
whether the-publisher ever made any use of the unusual rights awarded it by the Sunset
decision.
52. 92 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), modified, 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 849 (1951).
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copyrighted the play he had written seventeen years earlier. 53 In 1925
John Luther Long renewed the copyright in his novel and died shortly
thereafter. In 1932, Ricordi renewed the United States copyright in
Puccini's opera, and in the same year Paramount purchased from the
fiduciaries of the Long and Belasco estates the motion picture rights to
Long's novel and Belasco's play.' In 1945, because no one had renewed
its copyright, Belasco's play entered the public domain.
A few years later, Ricordi determined to license a motion picture
studio to make a film based on the Puccini opera.5 5 Ricordi maintained
that its 1901 contract with Long and Belasco implicitly granted Ricordi
the right to make or license a second-order derivative work (i.e. a movie
based on the opera) in addition to the right to make the primary derivative
work. Paramount countered that Ricordi had no motion picture rights in
the opera since Paramount owned the movie rights to the underlying
novel and play; without these rights, a film of the opera could not be
made.56 Ricordi sought a declaratory judgment to the effect that it was
the sole owner of movie rights in the opera and an injunction to prohibit
Paramount from claiming these rights. The District Court agreed with
Ricordi and granted the requested relief. The court concluded that the
agreement authorizing the creation of the derivative work also granted
the right to make a second-order derivative work based on the primary
one. 57 The court's description of the opera as "a piece of property wholly
separate and independent from the novel and drama,"" seems implicitly
to recognize a new property right theory. On appeal, the Second Circuit
modified the judgment, 59 distinguishing between the initial and renewal
53. It has long been held that performance of a play does not constitute publication
divesting one of his common-law copyright. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
Consequently, no matter how many times the Belasco play might have been performed
between 1900 and 1917, such performances had no effect on the validity of the 1917
copyright registraton of the play.
54. Pursuant to these purchases and a special arrangement with Ricordi covering the
use of certain music from the opera, Paramount released a movie of Madame Butterfly in
1933 starring Sylvia Sidney and Cary Grant. In 1915, a corporate predecessor had released
a silent version, starring Mary Pickford. By a 1913 contract, John Luther Long gave the
studio movie rights to his novel for five years. See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 537, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), modified, 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).
55. The opinion of the district court states that 1946 trade papers reported a sale by
Ricordi of the movie rights to the opera. Id. at 542.
56. Id. at 540.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 540-41.
59. 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951).
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terms of copyright and stressing the absence of any reference to the
renewal term in the 1901 contract. Consequently, the court held that even
if the contract granted Ricordi the right to film its opera, the grant
endured only for the initial copyright terms of the underlying works.60
Thus, insofar as the opera contained material from Long's novel, Ricor-
di's film rights in the opera expired with the novel's initial term in 1925.
As owner of film rights in the novel during its renewal term, Paramount
could forbid Ricordi "to make general use of the novel" in any film
based on the opera. 61 Paramount's 1932 purchase of movie rights in the
play, however, did not affect Ricordi's right to exploit material in the
opera based on Belasco's play, because the play was in the public
domain. 62 The court thus concluded that Ricordi could make or license a
movie using the new matter in the opera and the play but could not make
cinematic use of matter in the novel, while Paramount could make a
movie out of the novel or the play but could not use Puccini's music and
lyrics for the opera. 63 In short, the court declared a stalemate, ruling that
unless the parties reached an agreement, neither of them could make a
movie any audience would want to see or hear. 64
The court clearly arrived at a just result. The right to create a second-
order derivative work based on the primary derivative is not within the
usual scope of the parties' expectations when a derivative work is
licensed. Hence, it should be recognized only when the contract with the
author of the underlying work clearly and unambiguously conveys it. The
court could have reasonably concluded that the contractual language
granting Ricordi "all rights . . . dramatic or otherwise" in the opera
was not sufficiently clear and unambiguous to encompass a movie of the
opera. On the other hand, it is uncertain that the film version of the opera
as contemplated by Ricordi in the late 1940s was a second-order deriva-
tive work. Ricordi may have contemplated no more than a static filmed
record of a performance of Madame Butterfly. Such a film arguably
should be classified as the exploitation in a new medium of the primary
derivative. Courts have generally recognized this right; 65 the classic
60. Id. at 471.
61. Id. at 472.
62. Id. at 471.
63. Id. at 471-72.
64. In 1955, after Long's novel had fallen into the public domain, Madame Butterfly
was filmed again as an Italo-Japanese coproduction. See J. L. ANDERSON & D. RICHIE,
THE JAPANESE FILM 247 (1959).
65. See, e.g., Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968).
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situation is the exhibition of theatrical motion pictures on television.66
Nevertheless, Ricordi may have contemplated a fresh work that would
employ cinematic techniques such as location shooting and camera an-
gles. Such a production would clearly be a second-order derivative work,
and both the district and appellate courts were correct in holding that
permission of the owner of the rights in the underlying work was
required. That result, however, should have been based on the lower
court's reasoning that the 1901 contract did not clearly convey rights to
second-order derivative works.
The reasoning of the Second Circuit, based on the assumption of
discontinuity between initial and renewal term rights, may have undesir-
able results if extended beyond its factual context. Consider the result if,
instead of Paramount, the plaintiff in Ricordi had been the estate of John
Luther Long. It follows from the appellate court's reasoning that Ricordi
had no right to Madame Butterfly during the renewal term of Long's
novel. Thus, any performance of the opera after 1925 would have been
illegal.67 It was irrelevant whether Long survived into the renewal term:
absent renegotiation with Long or his successors-assuming such succes-
sors could be found and would agree-the court's reasoning would result
in copyright death for the opera from 1925, the year the renewal term of
Long's novel began, to 1953, the year it entered the public domain. Such
an aesthetic calamity was avoided only by the accident that the Long
estate did not sue Ricordi.
The Ricordi court's potential to condemn a derivative work to copy-
right death remained dormant until a federal district court in New York
decided Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. in 1974.68 WNET, New York
City's educational television station, presented a series of early movies
entitled The Silent Years. Silent film authority Paul Killiam assembled
the film series which was financed by Bowery Savings Bank. Among the
movies televised was The Son of the Sheik (1926), starring Rudolph
Valentino. The movie was based on a romantic novel written and copy-
righted by the once popular Edith M. Hull in 1925. Late that year, the
66. Id.
67. The district court clearly recognized this implication of Paramount's contentions,
as did the studio. "Defendant [Paramount] also claims that [Ricordi's] rights, if any,
expired in 1925 with the original term of the copyright in the Long novel. . . . If I
understand defendant's claim in this respect it is that [Ricordi] has no rights of any kind in
the Opera." 92 F. Supp. at 542.
68. 379 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 949 (1977).
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author conveyed to a movie studio "all the motion picture rights in and to
the said story for the entire world, together with the sole and exclusive
right to make motion picture versions thereof" for the initial and renewal
terms of her novel. The agreement purported to bind the heirs and
successors of the parties. The resulting movie was a box office smash.
Hull died in 1943, leaving as sole heir-at-law a daughter, Cecil W. Hull.
In 1952, Cecil renewed the copyright in her mother's novel, and in 1954
the copyright proprietor of the Valentino film renewed the copyright in
the movie. Between 1952 and 1965 the film was extensively televised in
the United States under the auspices of Paul Killiam. At no time did Cecil
Hull object to such exhibitions; indeed, there is no evidence that she was
even aware of them. In 1965 Cecil assigned to Raymond Rohauer, a film
speculator, "all of [her] right, title and interest (if any) in and to the
motion picture and television rights of every kind and character through-
out the world and in all languages" in her mother's novel. Rohauer
immediately advised Killiam that any further exhibition of the Valentino
film without Rohauer's permission would constitute copyright infringe-
ment. As a result of WNET's broadcast of the film in 1971, Rohauer
brought suit against Killiam's corporation, Killiam individually, the
television station, the corporation that owned the station, and the Bowery
Savings Bank. Although the district court dismissed the action against
the bank and Killiam personally, 69 it held the other defendants liable
under Ricordi:
[W]hen an author of a copyrighted work dies prior to the expiration
of the copyright term, and the next of kin applies for renewal before
the term expires, he acquires "a new and independent right in the
copyright, free and clear of any rights, interests, or licenses attach-
ed to the copyright for the initial term.' '70
Moreover, the trial court, quoting Professor Nimmer, summarily dis-
posed of the defendant's assertion that Cecil Hull was bound by her
mother's 1925 contract which purported to bind the author's successors:
If the author. . . is not living when the renewal rights vest, then
those persons who by statute succeed to the renewal rights are not
bound by any assignment executed by the author. . . so that the
assignee takes nothing.7'
Finally, Nimmer satisfied the court that the television exhibition of a film
69. Id. at 736.
70. Id. at 727 (quoting Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1937)).
71. Id. (quoting 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 117.3).
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during the renewal term of the underlying work was an infringing act
absent proper permission.7 2
At trial the defendants relied on the new property right theory, 7
3
insisting that a "motion picture is an independently copyrighted deriva-
tive work, the use of which cannot be controlled by the holder of the
renewal copyright in the underlying work." 74 The court held that the
defendants' position was unsupported by precedent.75 Its decision would
have resulted in copyright death for the film until the year 2000.76
Fortunately, the Second Circuit reversed the trial court on appeal.77
Judge Friendly, writing for the court, held that there was a sharp distinc-
tion between Ricordi, in which the contract between the authors of the
underlying and derivative work did not consider the underlying work's
renewal term, and Rohauer, in which the author of the underlying work
clearly conveyed renewal term rights but died prior to the renewal term's
commencement. In the latter situation, the court held:
[t]he equities lie preponderantly in favor of the proprietor of the
derivative copyright . . . A person who with the consent of the
author has created an opera or a motion picture film will often have
made contributions both literary, musical and economic as great as
or greater than the original author.78
Consequently, when the author of the underlying work dies before the
renewal term begins, the 1909 Act does not countenance copyright death
for the derivative work. Nevertheless, when the contract fails to mention
rights in the underlying work's renewal term, the Rohauer court upheld
the Ricordi rule. Thus, the problem of copyright death in this situation
remains acute.
V. BALANCING EQuITIEs: SECOND CHANCE FOR THE
AUTHOR vs. AVAILABILrTY TO THE PUBLIC
A solution to the copyright death problem will depend on the relative
weight courts assign to (1) insuring an author or his successors an
72. Id. (quoting 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 118).
73. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
74. 379 F. Supp. at 727.
75. Id.
76. Under the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, the duration of the copyright in the
novel is governed by 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(b) (West Supp. 1977 app.), which provides: "The
duration of any copyright, the renewal term of which is subsisting at any time between
December 31, 1976, and December 31, 1977, inclusive,. . . is extended to endure for a
term of seventy-five years from the date copyright was originally secured.
77. 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
78. Id. at 493.
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opportunity to profit from the underlying work, and (2) insuring the
public availability of derivative works. Although judicial attention has
centered almost exclusively on the first value, an occasional decision has
been heavily influenced by the second. Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. 79 is an excellent example. The Second Circuit was asked in
Bartsch to interpret a contract between the proprietor of an underlying
work and a movie studio from the early talking picture era. The contract
conveyed movie rights in the underlying work but, like most movie
contracts of the time, failed to mention the unknown television rights.
The court ruled that, absent a contractual provision to the contrary, the
film producers could televise the movie without renegotiating an agree-
ment with the proprietor of the underlying work. 80 Judge Friendly noted
that the court's decision:
provides a single person who can make the copyrighted work [i.e.,
the movie] available to the public over the penumbral medium,
whereas [a decision to the contrary] involves the risk that a dead-
lock between the grantor and the grantee might prevent the work's
being shown over the new medium at all.81
The Second Circuit's reasoning in Bartsch provides a conceptual basis
for refusing to apply the principle of discontinuity between the initial and
renewal copyright terms when its application would result in the copy-
right death of a derivative work. Once the author of an underlying work
consents to the creation of a derivative work, regardless of whether the
renewal term is mentioned in the contract, he and his successors as well
as the derivative work's owner should be held responsible for the deriva-
tive work's continued availability. A judicial rule favoring such avail-
ability should prevail not only when the problem arises from a lacuna in a
contract, as in Bartsch, but also when a difficulty is created by Congress'
lack of foresight. Just as the draftsmen of movie contracts prior to the
1940s could not anticipate the future significance of television exhibition
of films, so the draftsmen of the 1909 Copyright Act could not foresee
the significance of movies themselves. The only derivative works known
in 1909 were evanescent, live performances such as drama and opera,
which had no tangible form and left only the residue of spectators'
memories. The embryonic phonograph record and film industries were so
little understood by Congress that the 1909 Act failed to provide copy-
79. 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968).
80. Id. at 155.
81. Id.
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right protection for either. Moreover, until 1912,82 motion picture protec-
tion depended on two early judicial decisions which held movies copy-
rightable as a species of photograph; 3 the Act did not protect sound
recordings until 1971.84 The possibility of a technologically "captured"
derivative work such as a movie was not envisaged by the 1909 Con-
gress, and therefore, lawmakers could not have appreciated the need for a
public policy favoring the availability of these "captured" works.
Because copies of phonograph records are made available to the
public, their continued existence is ensured even after the record is
withdrawn from the catalogue. Similarly, the preservation and availabil-
ity of out-of-print books or periodicals is ensured by the vast network of
secondhand book dealers. Film studios, however, have been reluctant to
sell prints of films to the public. Consequently, when a movie is with-
drawn from theatrical and television exhibition, it becomes unavailable
to a greater extent than most other artistic works.85
Film studios hold inconsistent attitudes toward their films. On the one
hand, they want to retain complete control over their product and force
the customer to pay each time he views a film. 86 On the other hand,
unless the movie is a box office success, they consider it to be worthless.
Indeed, during Hollywood's golden age, studios were completely indif-
ferent to the aesthetic and historic value of films and ignorant of their
future economic value. Companies often destroyed all known prints of an
old film when they were about to market a remake.87 In the mid-1950s
82. 17 U.S.C. §§ 5(1), 5(m) (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356,
§ 5, 37 Stat. 488).
83. Harper & Bros. v. Kalem Co., 169 F. 61 (2d Cir. 1909), aff'd, 222 U.S. 55 (1911);
Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240 (3d Cir. 1903).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 5(n) (Supp. V 1975) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub.
L. No. 92-140, § 1(b), 85 Stat. 391).
85. Nevertheless, there are substantial numbers of film collectors, used film dealers,
and "underground" sources from which at least some films can be obtained in somewhat
the same manner as an out-of-print book can be obtained. See Nevins, supra note 11.
86. The film industry is currently considering ways to make the spectator pay afresh
for watching films on television, such as a system of "'two way pay cable,' where a
subscriber will pay a flat fee for service plus an extra charge to watch a specific program,"
or in other words, "a box office in everyone's home." Legal Affairs: The New Territory
Copyrights Will Cover, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 22, 1976, at 90 (quoting Peter W. Kuyper, Vice-
President, Paramount Pictures Corp.).
87. It is reported, for example, that MGM burned the negative and all known prints of
its 1933 version of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, for which Fredric March won an Oscar as best
actor of the year. The reason for the destruction was that MGM was about to release a
remake in 1940. See Ziniewicz, The Case for Film Piracy, 81 CASE & COMMENT 12, 15
(1976).
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Universal destroyed its library of silent film prints rather than absorb the
expense of transferring the films from flammable nitrate to acetate
stock. 88 Although film archives exist in abundance today, many studios
still permit their early movies to disintegrate in their own vaults.
It is not surprising, therefore, that these studios rarely insisted on
contractual provisions maximizing their ability to exhibit a film during
the underlying work's renewal term.89 Only with the most profitable
films did studios negotiate new agreements, and thereby save the films
from copyright death. Moreover, upon the transfer from one studio or
company to another of ownership or distribution rights in a block of
films, the conveyee frequently found it unprofitable to renegotiate for
rights in the renewal term. Consequently, many important films "be-
come consigned to a celluloid no-man's-land and eventually are doomed
to extinction, since if nobody actually owns them, [or more precisely, if
nobody can exhibit them without fear of infringement suits] nobody is
likely to spend money on their preservation." 90
The same blind indifference to the potential of their own products has
permeated film studios' policies relating to other media. For many years
these studios saw television as the enemy, never anticipating the bonanza
that would come from the licensing of old (and not so old) movies to TV
stations. Today, film studios are similarly hostile toward hobbyist film
collectors and purchasers of home videotape recorders. Once again they
are blind to the potential bonanza that could result from the sale of prints
and cassettes of films for the private home enjoyment of the cinephile. 91
The law, however, should not be shortsighted; rather, courts should
interpret the copyright law to correct at least some of the damage the
studios have permitted.
88. J. Tuska, The American Western Cinema: 1903-Present, in Focus ON THE WEST-
ERN 25, 30 (J. Nachbar ed. 1974).
89. The most that a studio could do under the 1909 Act was (a) require explicit
contractual language conveying movie rights for both the initial and renewal terms of the
underlying work, and (b) obtain conveyances of contingent rights in the underlying work
for its renewal term, signed by the then spouse and children, if any, of the author. Under
the Fred Fisher principle, such conveyances of renewal-term rights during the initial term
are clearly valid. Nevertheless, if the author died during the initial term and was survived
by a spouse or children who did not convey their rights, the studio had to renegotiate the
contract with such successors or let the film suffer copyright death.
90. W. K. EVERSON, THE ART OF W. C. FIELDS 108 (1967).
91. See Nevins, supra note 11, at 33. Such hostility may be slowly diminishing as the
companies become aware of the potential profits to be reaped by turning the televiewers
of America into videotape cassette collectors.
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Two rationales exist to ensure the exhibition of films during the
renewal term. First, the distinction between the initial and renewal terms
could be discarded. Second, the privilege of fair use could be invoked
when the public exhibition of a film is threatened by copyright death. The
district court in Rohauer defined fair use as " 'a privilege in others than
the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable
manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the
owner,' "92 and recognized that the doctrine empowers a court occasion-
ally to " 'subordinate the copyright holder's interest in a maximum
financial return to the greater public interest in the development of art,
science and industry.' "93 The court weighed four factors in determining
whether the doctrine applied to the continued exhibition of The Son of the
Sheik:
(1) was there a substantial taking, qualitatively or quantitatively; (2)
if there was, did the taking materially reduce the demand for the
original copyrighted property; (3) does the distribution of the infr-
inging material serve the public interest in the free dissemination of
information; (4) does the preparation of the material require the use
of prior materials dealing with the same subject matter.94
Focusing on the third criterion, the court concluded:
[t]here is no discernible public interest in the dissemination of "The
Son of the Sheik" sufficient to justify the infringement. . . .It can
scarcely be argued here that the enduring fame of Rudolph Valen-
tino or the intrinsic literary and historical merit of "The Son of the
Sheik" (whatever it may be) serves any public interest sufficient to
endow these defendants with the privilege of fair use.95
The district court's discussion of fair use is the weakest part of its
opinion. Two interpretations are possible. On the one hand, the opinion
may hold that The Son of the Sheik does not merit the privilege. Such a
holding would be clearly incorrect; as Justice Holmes states: "It would
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits."I The trial judge's
92. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd,
551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977) (quoting H. BALL, COPYRIGHT AND
LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
93. Id. at 732-33 (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publication, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.
1964)).
94. Id. at 733 (citing Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp.
1269, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
95. Id. at 733.
96. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
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admission that he had not seen the film "since the time I was taken by my
parents as a young boy, "97 renders a denial of the fair use defense based
on the movie's presumed lack of merit even more incredible. Alternative-
ly, the opinion may hold that no work of the imagination, regardless of
its aesthetic merits, can satisfy the public interest criterion of the fair use
doctrine. This interpretation is buttressed by the court's references to the
Zapruder film of President Kennedy's assassination98 and the letters of
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg99 as examples of works that would satisfy the
public interest criterion.
Although this reading of the trial court's decision in Rohauer is less
dangerous than the first interpretation, it is nevertheless narrow-minded.
Suppose the film at issue had not been a Valentino sex-and-sand epic, but
rather one of the early Western films directed for Universal Studios by
John Ford. In view of this director's acknowledged preeminence and the
huge gaps in our knowledge about his early works due to destruction of
all known prints,"°° the court should rule that the public interest requires
the preservation and availability of Ford's films. If, however, some films
deserve the privilege, it should be available to all; otherwise the law will
be utterly dependent on the highly fallible aesthetic views of judges, and
we will lose sight of the public interest in the preservation and availability
of creative works. To paraphrase the French film savant Henri Langlois,
we have no way of knowing what films the people of tomorrow will
decide are worth seeing, so we must save everything. Unfortunately,
Judge Friendly failed to address the lower court's treatment of fair use in
Rohauer beyond commenting that " [i]f we were obliged to rule on [this
defense], we would regard [it] as warranting somewhat more con-
sideration than did the district judge.''01
VI. THE COPYRIGHT REVISION Acr OF 1976
The Copyright Revision Act of 1976 gives appropriate recognition to
the public interest. It replaces the present structure of two copyright
97. 379 F. Supp. at 726 n.2.
98. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
99. Meeropol v. Nizer, 361 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). For later developments in
this case, see 505 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974); 381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); 417 F. Supp.
1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
100. Of the 38 films Ford directed at Universal during 1917-21, only one "has survived
the ravages of archaeological irresponsibility." A. SARRIs, THE JOHN FORD MOVIE MYs-
TERY 16 (1975).
101. 551 F.2d at 495.
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terms and compulsory renegotiation before a derivative work can be used
during the underlying work's renewal term with a single copyright term
covering the author's life plus fifty years. 102 It further provides that the
"grant . . .of any right under a copyright" may be terminated by the
author or his successors at any time between the thirty-fifth and fortieth
anniversaries of the grant. 103 This termination right is clearly the equiva-
lent of the compulsory renegotiation rule under the 1909 Act. The new
Act, however, contains a specific limitation on this right:
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its
termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant
after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the prepa-
ration after the termination of other derivative works based upon
the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant. 104
Thus, an author who conveys the movie rights in his 1978 novel may
later exercise his termination right to prevent any remake or sequel film,
but the termination judgment may not be used to frustrate the continuing
availability of the original film. On the other hand, if the author conveys
the live dramatic rights in the same novel and later exercises the right of
termination, it is arguable that the licensee may not thereafter authorize
any performances of the play; each such performance may fall within the
category of "other derivative works," which are expressly excepted
from the section 203(b)(1) limitation. The committee reports explicitly
state that under this section "a film made from a play could continue to
be licensed for performance after the motion picture contract has been
terminated but any remake rights covered by the contract would be cut
off." 05 Although the legislative history does not indicate the rationale
for these provisions, their effect is unmistakable: under the 1976 act, the
author retains his second chance to profit from his underlying work, but
no technologically fixed derivative work is condemned to copyright
death.
These provisions apply, however, only to grants "executed by the
102. 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(a) (West Supp. 1977 app.) (applicable to works created on or
after January 1, 1978).
103. 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a) (West Supp. 1977 app.) (applicable to assignments executed
on or after January 1, 1978). Section 203(a)(5) overrules the Supreme Court's decision in
the Fred Fisher case, supra note 36, and removes the author's power to sign away second-
chance rights, by providing that "Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstand-
ing any agreement to the contrary ...."
104. 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(b)(1) (West Supp. 1977 app.).
105. S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-1496,94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 127, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6089, 6173.
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author on or after January 1, 1978. ' ' 1° In Rohauer, the defendants
quoted the language of section 203(b)(1) and asked the district court to
read the essence of that provision into the 1909 Act. The court declined,
commenting: "[a]lthough this might well be deemed an admirable state-
ment of what the law should be, it is scarcely persuasive of what the law
is." 10
7
The 1976 Act contains another provision that may have the effect of
engrafting the crucial- part of the new property right theory onto some
transactions that predate the new law. Section 304(c) provides for an
inalienable termination right applicable to any "grant of a transfer or
license of the renewal copyright or any right under it, executed before
January 1, 1978 . . . ."' Termination of a grant under section 304(c)
may be effected at any time between the fifty-sixth and sixty-first an-
niversaries of the original copyright, or January 1, 1978 and January 1,
1983, whichever five-year period is later. 1°9 The committee reports
indicate that the purpose of this provision was to confer the benefit of the
new Act's longer copyright period upon those authors or authors' succes-
sors who had already signed away some or all of their renewal rights. 110
The Act provides further that any termination under either section 203(a)
or 304(c) is subject to the limitation that "[a] derivative work prepared
under authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be
utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination . .. .,,II
Unfortunately, these provisions are limited to renegotiations for re-
newal term rights in the underlying work consummated prior to January
1, 1978. In such cases, the exercise of the new statutory termination right
will not cause the copyright death of the film. When, however, the author
or his successors have not renegotiated the contract but merely renewed
a copyright in the underlying work, the predicate for the operation of
section 304(c), a "grant of a transfer or license of the renewal copyright
or any right under it," does not exist. In that situation, the film is
copyright dead-at least if the original contract failed to consider the
renewal term-until or unless the contract is renegotiated.
106. 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a) (West Supp. 1977 app.).
107. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd,
551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
108. 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(c) (West Supp. 1977 app.) (emphasis added).
109. 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(c)(3) (West Supp. 1977 app.).
110. S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1975);H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 140, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6089, 6186.
111. 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(c)(6)(A) (West Supp. 1977 app.).
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From an aesthetic ecology perspective, this result is unsatisfactory.
The decision in the Rohauer situation, in which the original contract con-
veyed renewal term rights but the author of the underlying work died
before the expiration of the initial term, should prevail in the Ricordi
situation in which the original contract failed to mention the renewal
term. This development would eliminate the possibility of copyright
death in two of the three situations presented earlier. 112
VII. THE PROBLEM OF CONTRACTUAL DEATH
Although the application of Rohauer to the Ricordi fact pattern would
alleviate the threat of copyright death in two of the foregoing situations,
that threat would remain when the grant of rights was restricted to a
specified period by the free choice of the parties. Because nothing in the
Copyright Act contributes to this problem, it is more appropriate to refer
to the unavailability of the derivative work at the conclusion of the
specified period as contractual, rather than copyright, death.
This situation is illustrated by the Sunset Securities case.113 It was
common practice in some of the smaller, more budget-conscious movie
studios to purchase rights in a work for a period of five to ten years.
Frequently, these contracts did not include an option to extend the term
by the payment of an additional sum, although a renewal option could be
added to a contract later if the profits from a particular film justified it.
Republic Pictures, which made the best action films of Hollywood's
golden age, entered many such short-term contracts to obtain the rights to
produce cliffhanger serials about the exploits of heroes and heroines such
as Red Ryder, Zane Grey's King of the Royal Mounted, and Edgar Rice
Burroughs' Jungle Girl. 114 Such contracts typically included a clause that
provided:
Upon the expiration of rights as to any picture or chapter, the
purchaser [i.e. the studio] shall deliver to the owner [i.e. the author
of the underlying work], or shall destroy, the negative and positive
prints of such picture, provided that Republic may retain such
negatives and prints as it may desire for library purposes."15
112. See text accompanying notes 5-6 supra.
113. See notes 46-51 supra and accompanying text.
114. The distribution term for the Red Ryder serial was set at seven and one-half years
from the date of general release. For the two chapter plays about King of the Royal
Mounted the term was eight and one-half years. The contract with Edgar Rice Burroughs
for the Jungle Girl serial provided for a seven-year distribution term, although modifica-
tions extended the term through 1955. See J. MATHIS, VALLEY OF THE CLIFFHANGERS 147,
156, 180, 217 (1975).
115. Quoted in id. at 156.
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The Republic serials, Adventures of Red Ryder (1940), King of the
Royal Mounted (1940), Jungle Girl (1941), and King of the Mounties
(1942) were all directed or codirected by William Witney, the supreme
director of pure action films. 116 From the perspective of film history and
aesthetic ecology, the public unavailability of these films is a loss as
unfortunate as that of The Son of the Sheik. Nevertheless, it resulted
from the free choice of the parties. To expect the courts to declare such
contractual provisions against public policy is as fruitless as awaiting the
imminent arrival of Godot.
The film pirate, that unsung hero of aesthetic ecology, may provide
relief from the contractual death problem. It is reasonable to assume that
at least a few prints of contractually dead films exist somewhere, and that
the projected profits from making these films available again are insuffi-
cient to justify negotiation of a new contract. Thus, only if a film pirate
duplicates existing prints and sells them to collectors for private use, will
such films be available. 117 Although it is unlikely that a film copyright
owner would bring a civil infringement action for duplication and sale of
prints of a contractually dead film, because by hypothesis he no longer
has any rights in the film, the owner of rights in the underlying work
could bring an action for the unauthorized copying and sale of a deriva-
tive work based on the underlying work. In addition, the pirate could be
prosecuted for criminal copyright infringement, a misdemeanor."II Even
if no civil or criminal action results, the contractually dead film is not
completely revived, because commercial exhibition of such a film consti-
tutes a separate act of infringement (although a private screening by a
collector does not). 119 Nevertheless, unless legislation is enacted to
rejuvenate contractually dead films through some form of compulsory
license, the only solution to the problem of contractual death lies in
violating the copyright law.
116. For a career study of this director, see Nevins, William Witney, in CLOSE-UP:
THE CONTRAcT DiRECTOR 189-227 (J. Tuska ed. 1976).
117. "Obviously a man who duplicates and sells materials to which he has no title is a
pirate. Just as obviously, if there had been no pirates, we should be without a number of
the films we prize most highly." W. KERR, THE SILENT CLOWNS 315 (1976). Chapter 32 of
Kerr's book, despite many errors on the legal aspects of the problem, is an otherwise
excellent treatment of lost films and the hobby of film collecting.
118. 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). See United States v. Atherton, No. 76-1597 (9th Cir.
Sept. 19, 1977); United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977).
119. See Nevins, supra note 11, at 12-18.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Legal treatment of literary property has differed from treatment of real
and personal property, primarily with regard to duration. Perpetual own-
ership of a creative work has long been impossible under English law,
and in the United States is forbidden by the Constitution. 120 After the
period for private exploitation of the work expires, the owner's interest in
the work is subordinated to the public's.
The law's treatment of an author's rights in areas other than duration,
however, has traditionally been analogous to treatment of an owner's
rights in other forms of property. Thus, an owner can do with his
property largely as he pleases.
More recent and enlightened approaches have developed in such di-
verse fields as first amendment law,' 2 ' land-use controls, 12 2 and air and
water pollution legislation,"' which impose a variety of limitations on the
property owner's freedom to ignore the public interest. This philosophy,
however, has not been applied to copyright law. The various compulsory
license provisions of the 1976 Act provide a beginning. The interpreta-
tions of copyright principles proposed in this article represent a further
step in the establishment of the general principle that no owner of
intellectual property may make decisions about the exploitation or nonex-
ploitation of that property in disregard of the public's interest in the
availability of all creative work.
Courts deciding cases in this area may profit more from analogies to
the law of child support than to principles of traditional property law. No
one is obliged to be a parent, but once a child is born its parents are
responsible for the child's continued existence and welfare. Similarly,
once an author gives birth to a creative work, he should be responsible
for the work's continued existence. When the work in question is deriva-
tive, both the owner of the derivative work and the author of the
underlying work who consented to the derivative's creation should be
responsible for the continued existence and availability of the work
within reasonable limits. Judicial recognition and appropriate use of such
principles would eliminate the aesthetically disastrous losses the public
has suffered as a result of copyright death.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
121. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
122. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
123. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975).
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